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MISSOURI LAW REVIEW
in Missouri. Both Jefferson County and St. Charles County have rejected
the county charter form of government. 75 This is apparently a manifesta-
tion of out-county fears that gaining power to act independently of the
state legislature in some areas may only result in the transfer of that power
to one city or interest group in the county. Such fears will arise at each
and every charter election, and, whether unfounded or not, will take some
time to allay.
The 1970 constitutional amendment has apparently given charter
counties more tools with which to work, but obtaining the approval of a
majority of voters for countywide programs may often be difficult because
of out-county opposition. Charter government does present many safe-
guards for out-county areas: the petition requirement to form a charter
commission, a countywide vote to adopt a charter, an elected county
legislative body, a majority vote of the county council, and a subsequent
countywide vote for countywide measures. These safeguards should be
sufficient to prevent any abuse of charter power. The 1970 amendment to
section 18(c) does not, however, clearly enumerate the powers of charter
counties. The uncertainty of what, if any, powers were added by the amend-
ment, the potential constitutional conflicts, and the interpretation prob-
lems must be resolved by judicial decision. A liberal judicial interpre-
tation of section 18(c) would seem desirable to enable charter counties






In recent years licensing of persons seeking to engage in various occu-
pations has been an ever-increasing phenomenon.' Occupational licensing
includes licensing of professionals, such as physicians, attorneys, and engi-
neers, as well as nonprofessionals, such as beauticians, barbers, boiler in-
spectors, and egg graders. It restricts certain occupations to those individuals
licensed by a particular state or subdivision of a state.2 Under a typical
75. See note 10 supra.
1. COUNCIL OF STATE GOVERNMENTS, OCCUPATIONS AND PROFESSIONS LICENSED
BY THE STATES, PUERTO Rico AND THE VIRGIN ISLANDS (1968); B. SHI MERG, B.
EssER, & D. KRUGER, MANPOWER ADMINISTRATION, U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, OCCUPA-
TIONAL LICENSING: PRACTICES AND POLICIES 13 (1973) [hereinafter cited as SuM1-
BERG]. In 1968 the Council of State Governments listed sixty-seven licensed oc-
cupations including abstractor, accountant, attorney, and physician, as well as
auctioneer, barber, boiler inspector, cemetery salesman, egg grader, librarian, milk
weigher, photographer, used car dealer, horseshoer, feeder pig dealer, tattoo artist,
and hunting guide.
2. M. FRIEDMAN, CAPITALISM AND FREomi 137, 141 (1962); W. GELLHORN,
INDIVIDUAL FREEDOM AND GOVERNMENTAL RESTRAINTS 113 (1956).
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OCCUPATIONAL LICENSING
licensing scheme, the license may be granted only after satisfying require-
ments of a licensing board,3 such as passing an examination, and may be
subject to denial for other reasons.4 Those granting the license are usually
members of the same occupation as those seeking licensure. 5 Entry of new
members into a field, therefore, may be effectively controlled by those
already members of a particular occupation by denial of licensure. In the
same manner, behavior of those already in the occupation may be con-
trolled by the threat of license suspension or revocation.6
Restricting entry into an occupation and controlling behavior of those
already in the occupation have strong economic implications. Economic
theory7 has long recognized the effect of such a dosed market structure on
existing members of the occupation, consumers, and potential entrants into
the market.8 A dosed market structure, a cartel, may be defined as:
Monopolistic control of the supply of a product or service for the
purpose of enhancing returns to members of the cartel and pro-
tecting members of the cartel from price competition that would
reduce the return to a competitive level.9
The resultant higher profit margin for those already in the market'0
directly correlates with less efficient utilization of resources and less con-
sumer choice. 1 The cost of protection for cartel members is increased
price of the product or service to consumers and restricted access of pro-
spective entrants into the market. Imposition of a licensing requirement
magnifies the detrimental effects created by preexisting natural barriers,
such as large start-up costs, specialized knowledge, and patents. 12 Given
these effects, additional entry barriers, such as occupational licensing,
should be discouraged unless strong reasons exist for perpetuating them.
Conversely, a competitive economic model insures that resources would
be used more efficiently and beneficially for prospective buyers and sellers.' 3
In such a competitive system both buyers and sellers have alternatives.
"Buyers can choose among alternative sellers, and sellers are free to enter
any line of production they believe will be profitable."' 4 Sellers have max-
imum mobility; they can enter and leave various industries at will. Entry
3. SHIMBERG, supra note 1, at 8-9.
4. Barron, Business and Professional Licensing-California: A Representative
Example, 18 STAN. L. REv. 640, 651-54 (1966).
5. BURAU OF NATIONAL AFFAIRS, ANTI-TRuST AND TRADE REGULATION RE-
FORT D-Z (No. 694, 1974); Barron, supra note 4, at 649.
6. Barron, supra note 4, at 644.
7. It must be remembered that economic models are just models and as
such may not accurately describe the complexities of the real world.
8. Barron, supra note 4, at 643.
9. Id. at 644.
10. J. BAIN, BARRIERS To NEw COMPTrIoN: THEIR CHARACTER AND CONSE-
QUENCES IN MANUFACTURING INDUSTRIES 172-73 (1956); Barron, supra note 4, at 643.
11. J. BAn, supra note 10, at 207.
12. Id.
13. Barron, supra note 4, at 640.
14. Id.
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will be determined by the existence or absence of a profit factor. Buyers
also have maximum mobility; they are free to choose among all sellers of
a particular product or service. Selection by buyers will eliminate those
sellers who cannot utilize their resources most efficiently. Theoretically,
prices will reflect this competitive situation. If price exceeds cost of a
given product or service, profit will exist. Because there are no restrictions
on entry into this market, new sellers are free to enter. The presence of
new sellers in the market will cause a reduction in price to near cost. 15
This competitive market system is the focal point of the Sherman Anti-
trust Act.16 In the main, the premises of the Act are coextensive with the
theories underlying this system. Many cartels which inhibit attainment of
this objective, therefore, have been condemned. 7 Although occupational
licensing produces the same economic effect, it has not traditionally been
recognized as a barrier to entry of the same posture. It is the purpose of
this comment to analyze the Sherman Antitrust Act as a vehicle for elim-
inating barriers to entry created by occupational licensing.
II. SCOPE OF THE SHERMAN ANTITRUST ACr
The jurisdiction of the Sherman Antitrust Act appears to be coexten-
sive with the commerce clause.' 8 The Act provides:
[Section 1] Every contract, combination in the form of trust or
otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among
the several States, or with foreign nations is declared to be ille-
gal ....
[Section 2] Every person who shall monopolize, or combine or
conspire with any other person or persons, to monopolize any part
of the trade or commerce among the several States, or with for-
eign nations, shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor .... 19
15. Id. at 640-41.
16. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1 et seq. (1890). See United States v. Reading Co., 253 U.S.
26 (1920); United States v. Union Pac. R.R. Co., 226 U.S. 61 (1912); United
States v. Trans-Mo. Freight Ass'n, 166 U.S. 290 (1897).
17. See United States v. Topco Associates, Inc., 405 U.S. 596 (1972).
[T]he freedom guaranteed each and every business, no matter how small,
is the freedom to compete .... Implicit in such freedom is the notion
that it cannot be foreclosed with rcspect to one sector of the economy
because certain private citizens or groups believe that such foreclosure
might promote greater competition in another sector of the economy.
Id. at 610. See also Am. Tobacco v. United States, 328 U.S. 781 (1946); Addyston
Pipe & Steel Co. v. United States, 175 U.S. 211 (1899); Patterson v. United States,
222 F. 599 (6th Cir. 1915); United Statcs v. National Retail Lumber Dealers'Ass'n,
40 F. Supp. 448 (D.C. Colo. 1941).
18. See United States v. South-Eastern Underwriters Ass'n, 322 U.S. 533, 557-
59 (1944); cf. Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 95 S. Ct. 2004, 2011-12 (1975); Burkc
v. Ford, 389 U.S. 320, 321 (1967); Mandeville Island Farms, Inc. v. Am. Crystal
Sugar Co., 334 U.S. 219, 229-35 (1948).
19. Sherman Antitrust Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-2 (1890).
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The threshold question for analysis is whether occupational licensing is
within this jurisdictional purview.2 0
A. Trade or Commerce
At the inception of Sherman Act litigation, case law focused heavily
on whether the activity in issue could properly be classified as constituting
"trade or commerce."' 21 Early decisions limited the scope of "trade or
commerce" to production, distribution, and exchange of goods and trans-
portation. Manufacture of a product,22 personal efforts or services un-
related to production,2 3 and learned professions were not "trade or com-
merce" within the meaning of the Act.24 This narrow construction was
short-lived in the commercial context;2 5 subsequent cases developed an
expansive view of the "trade or commerce" requirement. 26 No longer are
manufacturing or personal services deemed outside "trade or commerce."
Learned professions, such as law, medicine, and engineering, have also
been found to be within the ambit of "trade or commerce." 27
The scope of activities considered "trade or commerce" has been
defined in United States v. American Medical Association28 as ". . . all
occupations in which men are engaged for a livelihood. '29 Applying this
definition, occupations subject to licensing would seem to fall within the
phrase "trade or commerce." Any remaining doubt as to the validity of this
conclusion has been erased by the Supreme Court in Goldfarb v. Virginia
20. Rasmussen v. Am. Dairy Ass'n, 472 F.2d 517 (9th Cir. 1973).
Conduct of the defendant is within the jurisdictional reach of the Sher-
man Act if Congress can prohibit that conduct under the Commerce
Clause .... Before this general test is particularized, an important dis-
tinction should be stressed-the distinction between jurisdictional ques-
tions ... and the question of a ... substantive violation of the Sherman
Act....
Id. at 521.
21. Federal Baseball Club v. National League, 259 U.S. 200 (1922); United
States v. Trans-Mo. Freight Ass'n, 166 U.S. 290 (1897); United States v. E. C.
Knight Co., 156 U.S. 1 (1895); see Addyston Pipe & Steel Co. v. United States, 175
U.S. 211 (1899).
22. United States v. E. C. Knight Co., 156 U.S. 1 (1895).
23. Federal Baseball Club v. National League, 259 U.S. 200 (1922).
24. Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 497 F.2d 1 (1974), rev'd, 95 S. Ct. 2004(1975).
25. In noncommercial activity "trade or commerce" remains a stumbling block
to application of the Sherman Antitrust Act. See Marjorie Webster Jr. College v.
Middle States Ass'n of Colleges & Secondary Schools, 432 F.2d 650, 654 (D.C. Cir.
1970) (antitrust laws do not apply to school accreditation organizations because
the restriction is not with regard to commercial activity). Contra, Goldfarb v. Vir-
ginia State Bar, 95 S. Ct. 2004, 2012-13 (1975).
26. United States v. South-Eastern Underwriters Ass'n, 322 U.S. 533, 539, 547
(1944); United States v. American Medical Ass'n, 110 F.2d 703, 710 (D.C. Cir.
1940).
27. Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 95 S. Ct. 2004, 2012-13 (1975).
28. 110 F.2d 703 (D.C. Cir. 1940).
29. Id. at 710.
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State Bar.30 In rejecting the "learned professions" exemption to "trade or
commerce," the Court said:
[T]he nature of an occupation standing, alone, does not provide
sanctuary from the Sherman Act ... nor is the public service aspect
of professional practice controlling in determining whether Section
1 includes professions. Congress intended to strike as broadly as
it could in Section 1 of the Sherman Act .... 31
Given this broad statement, any allegation that occupational licensing
does not fall within "trade or commerce" would have little merit.
B. Among The Several States
Assuming that occupational licensing is trade or commerce, a second
requirement must be met before the Sherman Antitrust Act's jurisdiction
attaches: "trade or commerce" must be "among the several states." 2
"Trade or commerce" purely intrastate in character and effect fails to
meet this jurisdictional test.3 3
Most early cases turned on a local-interstate distinction in determining
whether this jurisdictional requirement had been met.3 4 One of the first
cases litigated under the Act, United States v. E. C. Knight Co.,35 held that
manufacture of goods was local in character and therefore outside the
Act's jurisdiction.3 6 Such a local analysis greatly limited the scope of the
Act.
Modem cases have rejected this local analysis. The distinct trend
has been an expansive construction of the commerce clause,3 7 resulting
in a broader jurisdictional reach for the Sherman Antitrust Act.3 8 Two
predominate theories have advanced this trend. The first of these, plenary
control, emphasizes the use of facilities of interstate movement.3 0 The
30. 95 S. Ct. 2004 (1975).
31. Id. at 2013.
32. Sherman Antitrust Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1890).
33. United States v. Yellow Cab Co., 332 U.S. 218, 230 (1947). See also
Evanston Cab Co. v. Chicago, 325 F.2d 907 (7th Cir. 1963) (local operation of
taxicabs did not constitute interstate commerce within the meaning of the Act);
John Kalin Funeral Home, Inc. v. Fultz, 313 F. Supp. 435 (W.D. Wash. 1970)
(if all mortuary supplies were delivered to and came to rest in plaintiff's estab.
lishment and never resold, the Act's jurisdiction did not attach).
34. See, e.g., Industrial Ass'n v. United States, 268 U.S. 64 (1925); Hopkins v.
United States, 171 U.S. 578 (1898); United States v. E. C. Knight Co. 156 U.S. 1
(1895).
35. 156 U.S. 1 (1895).
36. Id. at 16.
37. Mandleville Island Farms, Inc. v. Am. Crystal Sugar Co., 334 U.S. 219
(1948); United States v. South-Eastern Underwriters Ass'n, 322 U.S. 533 (1944);
Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942).
38. See text accompanying note 18 supra.
39. United States v. Women's Sportswear Mfrs. Ass'n, 336 U.S. 460 (1939);
Las Vegas Merchant Plumbers Ass'n v. United States, 210 F.2d 732 (9th Cir. 1954).
In Rasmussen v. Am. Dairy Ass'n, 472 F.2d 517 (9th Cir. 1973), the court found
a local manufacturer of beverages had a sufficient relationship to the interstate
commerce in fluid milk to come within Congress' plenary control over interstate
commerce. The opinion, in dictum, indicated barbering may not satisfy the juris.
dictional requirements.
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second focuses upon the interstate impact of an activity-even one totally
local in character. 40
Under the first approach the scope of the commerce clause is based
on Congress' plenary control over the instrumentalities of interstate move-
ment.4 1 Through the "necessary and proper" clause, 42 this control reaches
back to the point of origin and forward to the point at which the modes
of interstate movement are no longer involved.4 3
Most likely, occupational licensing under state statutes would be
immune from Sherman Act jurisdiction under this rationale. Licensing
statutes center primarily on restricting the practice of an occupation
within a given state or subdivision and do not involve tangible interstate
movement.
The second approach is conceptually broader. This approach finds
its genesis in the opinion of Chief Justice Marshall in Gibbons v. Ogden.44
Marshall defined the scope of the commerce clause as commerce which
concerns or affects more than one state.4 5 It is unclear, however, what
requisite effect must be achieved to meet this constitutional test. The
predominate approach previously seemed to have hinged on whether
the cumulative impact of the activity actually exerted a substantial eco-
nomic effect on interstate commerce.4 6 If it did, then the activity-whether
purely local or not-was within the realm of the commerce clause. How-
ever, in Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States47 and Perez v. United
States48 the Court stated that the scope of the commerce clause included
intrastate activity which might have a substantial effect on interstate
commerce.4 9 These two cases may indicate that potential (as opposed to
actual) and substantial interstate effect will be sufficient to bring the
activity within the reach of the commerce clause.
Restrictive interpretations of the commerce clause continue to surface,
however. A recent Supreme Court case, Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar,0
40. Burke v. Ford, 389 U.S. 320, 321 (1967); United States v. South-Eastern
Underwriters Ass'n, 322 U.S. 533, 549-52 (1943); Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S.
111 (1942).
41. See, e.g., Champion v. Ames, 188 U.S. 321 (1903); Oklahoma-Texas Trust
v. SEC, 100 F.2d 888 (10th Cir. 1939).
42. U.S. CoNsr. art. I, § 8.
43. United States v. Sullivan, 332 U.S. 689 (1948); United States v. Darby, 312
U.S. 100 (1941); McDermott v. Wisconsin, 228 U.S. 115 (1913).
44. 22 U.S. 1 (1824).
45. Id. at 7.
46. The fact that one individual's activity has a trivial impact on interstate
commerce is not sufficient to remove him from the scope of federal regulation. The
appropriate test is the cumulative impact of those similarly situated. See Wickard
v. Fillburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942); Smolowe v. Delendo Corp., 136 F.2d 231 (2d Cir.
1943). See also Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294 (1964).
47. 379 U.S. 241 (1964).
48. 402 U.S. 146 (1971).
49. Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241, 258 (1964);
Perez v. United States, 402 U.S. 146, 152 (1971).
50. 95 S. Ct. 2004 (1975).
19761
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seemingly resurrects the earlier "actual effect" argument.5 1 While finding
restraint on the availability of legal services substantially affects inter-
state commerce, the Court based its analysis on the local-interstate dis-
tinction.52 Giting numerous factors, the Court concluded that "a sub-
stantial volume of commerce was involved."53 Goldfarb indicates that facts
showing actual and substantial interstate effect must be alleged to meet
the Sherman Antitrust Act's jurisdictional requirements. Thus, the Court
may be retreating from the "potential interstate effect" test applied in
Heart of Atlanta Motel and Perez.5 4
The impact of this decision on occupational licensing litigation cannot
be underestimated. By requiring actual effect, occupational licensing stat-
utes which create a cartel-like impact, but fail actually to affect a sub-
stantial volume of commerce, may be immune from antitrust action for
failure to satisfy the jurisdictional requirements.
III. THE STATE AcTION EXEMPTION
Even if occupational licensing falls within the jurisdictional require-
ments of the Sherman Antitrust Act, a major obstacle confronting antitrust
litigation is the state action exemption. Licensing is primarily achieved by
state statute. In Parker v. Brown55 the Supreme Court found California's
statutory program regulating prices, disposition, and production of raisins
ultimately moving in interstate commerce outside the purview of the Act. 0
The rationale of this decision rested on the premise that Section 1 of the
Act was directed at private action rather than state action:
We find nothing in the language of the Sherman Act or in its
history which suggests its purpose was to restrain a state or its
officers or agents from activities directed by its legislature.5 7
Respect for federal-state comity and ultimate preservation of the fed-
eral system also influenced the Parker holding.5 8 Emphasizing action by
independent state officials, sanctioned by legislative mandate, Parker
formed the basis for a judicially created state action exemption to the
Act.5 9 The purpose of this exemption was to exclude state-compelled anti-
51. See text accompanying note 46 supra.
52. 95 S. Ct. at 2011-12.
53. Id. at 2012.
54. See text accompanying note 49 supra.
55. 317 U.S. 341 (1943). Parker involved a suit brought by a California
producer and packer of raisins. The suit challenged California's Agricultural Pro.
rate Act. The Act required each raisin producer to d~liver over two-thirds of his
crop to an" agency authorized by law to control marketing and eliminate competi-
tion, thus increasing the price of raisins. A three judge federal court enjoie en-
forcement of the Act finding that it: (1) viblated the Sherman Antitrust Act; and
(2) constituted an undue burden on commerce. The Supreme Codirt reversed.
56. Id. at 352.
57. Id. at 350-51.
58. Id. at 351. See also P. BENSON, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE COMMERCE
CLAUSE 243-44 (1970).
59. Pogue, The Rationale of Exemption from Antitrust, 19 A.B.A. ANTi-TRusT
SEc.rON 313, 325-26 (1961).
[Vol. 41
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competitive goals and means from the scope of the Act. Underpinning this
exemption was the perceived congressional directive to prevent only pri-
vate anticompetitive actions. 60
The scope of the state action exemption has been left unclear by
subsequent decisions. Attempts at definition generally emerge in one of
three patterns. The majority of federal courts have adopted a three-pronged
mechanical approach.61 A substantial minority embrace a more flexible
variation of the three-pronged mechanical approach. 62 Finally, a few
courts interpret the state action exemption along the lines of a police power
rationale.63
Those circuits adopting the three-pronged mechanical test embrace a
restrictive view of Parker.64 Attempts at definition of this test can best
be illustrated by Traveler's Insurance Co. v. Blue Cross of Western Penn-
sylania.6 5 In that case, the defendants argued that state regulation of the
insurance business and state approval to operate as an insurance carrier in
Pennsylvania exempted them from an action brought under the Sherman
Antitrust Act. Rejecting this contention, the court stated that ". . . regula-
tion and supervision alone do not constitute a delegation of governmental
authority."6 6 Further case law using this mechanical test has refined the
exemption and three essential elements have emerged: (1) a legislatively
created entity; (2) furtherance of an express public policy; and (3) express
statutory authorization to utilize anticompetitive means to achieve the
specific governmental purpose expressed.6 7 Absence of one of these ele-
ments precludes application of the state action exemption.
Other circuits have adopted a more flexible approach. These circuits
have not required all three elements of the mechanical test to be present
before the state action exemption is applied. 68 Rather, emphasis has been
60. Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341, 351 (1943).
61. See New Mexico v. Am. Petrofina, 501 F.2d 363 (9th Cir. 1974); Hecht
v. Pro-Football, Inc., 444 F.2d 931 (D.C. Cir. 1971); Whitten v. Paddock Pool
Builders, Inc., 424 F.2d 25 (1st Cir. 1970); Allstate Ins. Co. v. Lanier, 361 F.2d
870 (4th Cir. 1966); E. W. Wiggins Airways, Inc. v. Mass. Port Authority, 362
F.2d 52 (1st Cir. 1966); Traveler's Ins. Co. v. Blue Cross of W. Pa., 298 F. Supp.
1109 (W.D. Pa. 1969); Schenley Indus. v. N. J. Wine & Spirit Wholesalers Ass'n,
272 F. Supp. 872 (D.N.J. 1967); Marnell v. United Parcel Serv., 260 F. Supp. 391
(N.D. Cal. 1966).
62. See Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 497 'F.2d 1 (4th Cir. 1974), rev'd, 95
S. Ct. 2004 (1975); Washington Gas Light Co.* v. Virginia Elec. & Pwr. Co., 438
F.2d 248 (4th Cir. 1971); Asheville Tobacco v. FTC, 263 F.2d 502 (4th Cir. 1959).
63. See Hitchcock v. Collenberg, 140 F. Supp. 894, 900, 902 (D. Md. 1956);
cf. Olsen v. Smith, 195 U.S. 332, 345 (1904).
64. Whitten v. Paddock Pool Builders, Inc., 424 F.2d 25 (1st Cir. 1970). "The
Court's emphasis [in Parker] on the extent of the state's involvement preclude[s]
the facile conclusion that action by any public official automatically confers ex-
emption." Id. at 30.
65. 298 F. Supp. 1109 (W.D. Pa. 1969).
66. Id. at 1112.
67. Id. at 1111.
68. Washington Gas Light Co. v. Virginia Elec. & Pwr. Co., 438 F.2d 248
(4th Cir. 1971).
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placed on the existence of statutorily created state machinery and state
supervision implementing an important state policy.69 If these factors are
present, the Parker state action exemption will apply. This approach
differs from the mechanical test in that it does not require an express
statutory goal of anticompetitive activity, nor does it necessarily require
expressly authorized anticompetitive means to achieve the state policy.
The emphasis of this approach focuses upon a statutorily created agency
and an overriding public interest. Failure to control affirmatively the activ-
ities of such an agency,70 or expressly to set out approval of anticompetitive
goals and means in the enabling statute71 does not preclude application
of the state action exemption.
The third interpretative approach, present in a few cases, rests its
analysis primarily upon state regulation falling within the scope of a
state's police power.72 This approach emphasizes a state's compelling in-
terest in protection of public health, safety, and other valid interests.
Presence of such an interest, without more, triggers the state action exemp-
tion.73 Absence of express state anticompetitive goals, authorization of
anticompetitive means, or lack of state supervision do not in themselves
preclude application of the state action exemption.
The continued predominance of the mechanical test was recently
thrown into question by the Goldfarb decision.7 4 The Supreme Court did
not expressly adopt the mechanical test enunciated in lower court de-
cisions, nor did it cite to any case law adopting this test in support of its
position.7 5 Rather, the Court, while recognizing the existence of a state
statute and state agency, expressed the prerequisites for the state action
exemption as "activity compelled by the state as sovereign." 70 The Court,
in dictum, stated:
We recognize that the States have a compelling interest in the
practice of professions within their boundaries, and that as part of
their power to protect the public health, safety, and other valid
69. Id. at 251-52.
70. Id. at 252.
71. Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 497 F.2d 1 (4th Cir. 1974), rev'd, 95 S. Ct.
2004 (1975); Woods Exploration & Prod. Co., v. Aluminum Co., 438 F.2d 1286 (5th
Cir. 1971).
The concept of state action is not susceptible to rigid, bright-line rules.
Each case must be considered on its own facts in order to determine
whether or not the anti-competitive consequence is truly the action of
the state.
Id. at 1294.
72. Hitchcock v. Collenberg, 140 F. Supp. 894 (D. Md. 1956). See also Olsen
v. Smith, 195 U.S. 332 (1904) (a pre-Parker case holding licensing of river pilots
properly within the state's police power).
73. Hitchcock v. Collenberg, 140 F. Supp. 894 (D. Md. 1956).
74. Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 95 S. Ct. 2004 (1975).
75. The Goldfarb opinion did, however, cite Olsen v. Smith, discussed note
72 supra. See note 63 and accompanying text supra.
76. 95 S. Ct. 2004, 2015 (1975).
EVol. 41
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interests they have broad power to establish standards for licensing
practitioners and regulating the practice of professions.7
The Goldfarb rationale for the state action exemption approximates the
third interpretative approach. The opinion may indicate a shift toward a
broader exemption coextensive with a state's police power.
Expansion of the state action exemption would have strong repercus-
sions in occupational licensing litigation. Occupational licensing, by its very
definition, is statutory. It may very well be argued under the police power
test that such licensure is properly deemed a "compelling interest . . . of
the state to protect public health, safety, and other valid interests. .. 7
If this argument is sustained, occupational licensing would be immune
from the remedial efforts of the Sherman Antitrust Act.
Similarily, if the second approach were applied, occupational licensing
could properly be found within the state action exemption if a statutorily
created licensing agency was deemed to further an important state policy.
The exemption would apply regardless of the lack of affirmative control
over licensing activities or absence of an express statutory intention to
utilize anticompetitive means toward achievement of an anticompetitive
goal. Consequently, the cartel-like effect of licensing statutes would be im-
posed without inquiry into the presence of legislative intention to impose
such a result.
Under the three-pronged mechanical test, occupational licensing would
not be exempt per se from the thrust of the Act. Although occupational
licensing has its genesis in state statutes, this alone would not invoke the
state action exemption. Generally, monopolistic public policy is not ex-
pressed in the licensing statutes, nor are anticompetitive means authorized
to achieve a monopolistic policy. Absence of either of these elements would
preclude invocation of the state action exemption and subject occupa-
tional licensing to antitrust litigation.7 9
Such a strict construction of Parker comports with the basic policy
underlying the Act.80 Although designed to apply solely to private action,8 1
the objective of the Act is to promote and protect a competitive economic
system and exceptions to its application should be narrowly construed.
This goal would not be vitiated by a narrow construction of the Parker
exemption. Indeed, the Court in Parker stated that the exemption did not
apply to private action masquerading as state action.8 2 Furthermore, the
Parker decision was influenced by the existence of an express federal
policy coextensive with state policy.83 California had adopted a state
77. Id. at 2016.
78. Id.
79. Traveler's Ins. Co. v. Blue Cross of W. Pa., 298 F. Supp. 1109 (W.D. Pa.
1969).
80. Northern Pac. Ry. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 4 (1958).
81. Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341, 351 (1943).
82. Id. at 351.
83. See P. BENSON, supra note 58, at 244.
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statute similar to the Federal Agricultural Agreement Act. The California
statute covered areas of commerce in which Congress had not expressly
legislated, but which directly effectuated policies of the federal statute.
This consistency of interest, arguably, was the pivotal factor in the Parker
decision. Accordingly, this factor should limit the scope of the state
action exemption to state programs consistent with an express national
policy.8 4
The narrow three-pronged mechanical test is the most favorable to
litigants attacking occupational licensing. Unless an express state policy,
expressly authorizing anticompetitive means is sanctioned for use by a
legislatively created entity, the state action exemption should not apply
and occupational licensing would not be immune from the reach of the
Sherman Antitrust Act.
IV. AN UN4REASONABLE RESTRAINT op TRADE
Assuming occupational licensing is not immune from the Sherman
Antitrust Act by reason of the state action exemption, liability is not auto.
matic. Liability under the Act is based upon an activity's injury to the
public.8 5 A corollary to finding public injury is a finding that the activity
in issue is unreasonable under the facts of the particular situation80 or be-
cause the very nature of the activity is unreasonable per se.87
The reasonableness standard is a judicially created concept.88 It finds
statutory support, however, in the express statutory policy to promote com-
petition and protect the public from the effects of a noncompetitive
market.89 It follows that only conduct that offends this statutory policy
should be condemned as an unreasonable restraint of trade.90
Determining what constitutes unreasonable activities or practices is
84. Cf. Hecht v. Pro-Football, 444 F.2d 931, 937 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
85. Rogers v. Douglas Tobacco Board of Trade, Inc., 266 F.2d 636, 644 (5th
Cir. 1959).
86. Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 63 (1911); Lynch v. Mag-
navox Co., 94 F.2d 888, 891 (9th Cir. 1938); Sandidge v. Rogers, 167 F. Supp. 553,
559-60 (S.D. Ind. 1958). See also Feddersen Motors, Inc. v. Ward, 180 F.2d 519
(10th Cir. 1950).
87. Certain activities are per se unreasonable-i.e., the activity is so likely to
injure the public under any set of circumstances that no inquiry is made into the
existing fact situation. Courts have found price fixing, division of markets, group
boycotts and tying arrangements to be per se unreasonable. Northern Pac. Ry. Co. v.
United States, 856 U.S. 1, 5 (1958).
88. Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1 (1911); United States v.
American Tobacco Co., 221 U.S. 106 (1911). See generally Bloom, What is Anti-
trust?, 9 N.Y.L.F. 5, 8 (1963); Jones, Historical Development of the Law of
Business Competition, 86 YALE L.J. 207, 220 (1926).
89. United States v. Union Pac. R.R. Co., 226 U.S. 61 (1912).
To preserve from undue restraint the free action of competition in inter-
state commerce was the purpose which controlled Congress in enacting
this statute [Sherman Antitrust Act], and the courts should construe the
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a difficult task. Courts must analyze all economic factors peculiar to the
particular trade or industry and- their effect on the competitive market.91
Pertinent factors considered in making this determination traditionally
include: (1) the intensity and dimension of the relevant market; (2) the
history of the restraint; (3) the nature of the restraint and its effect, actual
or probable; and (4) the evil believed to exist, the reason for adopting
the particular remedy, and the purpose or end sought to be attained.
92
Examination of occupational licensing statutes in terms of all the
above factors is a prerequisite to finding a licensing scheme an unreason-
able restraint of trade. Each licensing scheme would have to be examined
in light of its particular factual context. The last two of the above- fac-
tors particularly lend themselves to a general analysis.
The nature of the restraint imposed by occupational licensing is a
barrier to entry.93 Empirical evidence supports the conclusion that most
occupational licensing statutes have an inhibiting effect on free competi-
tion thereby causing public injury.94 A case study reported by the Federal
Trade Commission is illustrative.9 5 The study compared television re-
pair rates in two states, one utilizing a licensure system and the other a
certification system. The licensing state had repair bills twenty percent
higher than those' in the nonlicensed system. This study strongly suggests
that the effect of such licensing statutes, by limiting the number of sellers
of a product or service, is to force prices to a high, noncompetitive level.
The last factor encompasses a balancing test. Proponents of occupa-
tional licensing argue that public health and welfare would be endangered
in the absence of regulatory statutes. Therefore, they contend, occupational
licensing statutes protect the innocent public against the abuses of charla-
tans and insure that only competent persons are allowed to engage in the
occupation.96 This argument might have significant merit in a situation
where an unwary consumer who is victimized by an incompetent practi-
tioner would suffer irremediable harm, such as medicine, law, and other
professions, but it loses its potency in the nonprofessional area.
A pivotal argument in support of finding occupational licensing an
unreasonable restraint of trade in nonprofessional fields is the availability
91. Chicago Board of Trade v. United States, 246 U.S. 231 (1918).
92. Id. at 238.
The legality of an agreement or regulation cannot be determined by so
simple a test, as whether it restrains competition. Every agreement con-
cerning trade, every regulation of trade, restrains. To bind, to restrain,
is of their very essence. The true test of legality is whether the restraint
imposed is such as merely regulates and perhaps thereby promotes com-
petition or whether it is such as may suppress or even destroy compe-
ion.
93. Occupational licensing statutes would not fall within the per se categories
and thus would necessarily have to be found unreasonable in the circumstances to
be subject to action under the Sherman Antitrust Act.
94. Thomsen v. Cayser, 243 U.S. 66 (1917).
95. FE.D. TADE Comm'N, BUEAu or EcoNoMicS, REGULATON Or Tm TELE-
VISION REPAIR INDUSTRY IN LOUisIAIA AND CALIFORNIA, A CAsE STUDY (1974).
96. See W. GELLioRN, supra note 2, at 109.
1976]
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of alternative methods which advance the same interests that licensing
purports to further.97 By either registration or certification the public in-
terest can be protected without the resultant public injury imposed by a
licensing scheme.
Registration is the least restrictive alternative. By requiring all in-
dividuals who wish to practice a given trade to register with the state,
consumers may choose among all available sellers. Any seller who does not
sufficiently produce will eventually be cast aside in favor of sellers
whose products or services measure up to consumer standards.08
Certification is a second available alternative. Under a certification
scheme a governmental agency may certify an individual as qualified to
practice a particular trade, but may not prevent noncertified persons
from selling the same product or service.99 Consumers are thus given the
choice of selecting among all available sellers. Simultaneously, certification
assures that those certified are competent.
Perhaps the most persuasive factor courts should consider in de-
termining the reasonableness of occupational licensing statutes is the policy
underlying the Sherman Antitrust Act itself. This policy was most aptly
stated in Northern Pacific Railway Company v. United States:100
It [the Sherman Antitrust Act] rests on the premise that the un-
restrained interaction of competitive forces will yield the best al-
location of our economic resources, the lowest prices, the highest
quality and the greatest material progress, while at the same time
providing an environment conducive to the preservation of our
democratic political and social institutions. But even were that
premise open to question, the policy unequivocally laid down by
the Act is competition.10'
Occupational licensing statutes inherently conflict with this policy
by creating barriers to entry. To find a licensing statute reasonable, courts
must analyze the factors previously listed. Only if the competitive policy
of the Act is outweighed by competing public interests should occupational
licensing be deemed reasonable.
V. CONCLUSION
Occupational licensing statutes present an analytical dilemma. Most
certainly, many statutes blatantly offend the competitive economic policy
the Sherman Antitrust Act seeks to advance. However, these statutes may
be immune from the thrust of the antitrust remedies because of lack of
jurisdiction under the commerce clause or the state action exemption. Any
litigant seeking to subject occupational licensing to antitrust analysis will
be faced with these problems.
97. See M. FRIEDmAN, supra note 2, at 148-49; Barron, supra note 4, at 660-65.
98. See Barron, supra note 4, at 662, 664.
99. See M. FRiEDA , supra note 2, at 149; Barton, supra note 4, at 663.
100. 356 U.S. 1 (1958).
101. Id. at 4.
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The major problem facing courts in occupational licensing litigation
will be the determination of which statutes should be preserved. Not
every occupational licensing scheme should fall under the Act. In many
professions it may be persuasively argued that licensing is the only adequate
safeguard preventing irreparable public injury. This argument is par-
ticularly strong in the legal and health professions. In both, the con-
sumer may not have sufficient knowledge or expertise to choose a qualified
practitioner. A wrong choice could be an irreversible decision jeopardizing
life or property. In such situations public policy must be counterbalanced
against economic ideals. Where the reasonableness of the restraint of trade
outweighs the competitive philosophy of the Sherman Antitrust Act, the
competitive ideal must give way to prevent public injury.
KATHLEEN SOWM STOLAR
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